Confused by Taobao and Alipay? You’re in luck. Agreetao is the Alibaba Group’s gift to foreigners who don’t understand complicated payment processes. The wholesale website features clean lines, neatly-categorized products, and relatively intuitive design completely in English as a taobao english.
The removal of the language barrier makes browsing the sea of clothes, bags, stationery, makeup, gadgets, home items, and more much easier than before. The days of translating keywords on Google Translate, plugging them into Taobao, and hoping to turn up a gem are over.
However, it’s obvious from the product names, descriptions, and tags that English isn’t the sellers’ first language. Many item names are simply strings of search engine tags, such as “free shipping unicorn designer laser silver horse clutch bag HARAJUKU unicorn woman handbag horse bag.” But the same is true of Taobao, so at least on Agreetao you can understand the tags and change your search accordingly.
Despite the broken English and tag overload, the sellers all understand English to some degree. Agreetao doesn’t allow Chinese input in its messaging fields, which means communication between buyer and seller (private messaging, feedback, and additional comments) must take place in English. The sellers I have communicated with had no problems understanding me and telling me my order was “OK.”
Personally, I found my orders more than “OK.” I’ve bought necklaces for USD 3 each, a lifetime supply of cute sticky notes from Korea for USD 7, and the aforementioned unicorn clutch (don't ask) for USD 10. I don't doubt I would have been able to find slightly better deals on Taobao, but it would have required more hours and patience, both of which are often in short supply.
To sweeten the deal even further, most sellers offer free international shipping, making Agreetao a viable competitor to Amazon – even if you enjoy free shipping with Amazon Prime.
Despite Agreetao being a “wholesale” website, single units are also available for purchase. You may get more of a discount if you buy in bulk, but they’re often negligible. Some items are subject to a minimum order, but you can filter your search results to show only products available for single-item purchases. In my experience, most are.
I thought Agreetao was perfect right until I got to the part of the purchase where I typed in my shipping details; I was shocked to find that China wasn’t an option on the dropdown menu. However, I wasn't deterred because if there’s one thing that living in China has taught me, it’s that anything is possible as long as you ask. I asked the seller over private messaging if he’d mind shipping to Beijing, and he was happy to accommodate me.
Problem solved, I thought, and wrote a fake address in the online form. I was going to leave him my Beijing address in the additional comments, but came up against another problem: the system didn’t let me input messages in Chinese characters.
I found a solution by chatting with the seller about my dilemma: Agreetao supports the WebATM instant messaging system that Taobao uses and integrates it into the website. Buyers can use their Agreetao ID to log in and chat with sellers in real time. Chinese is supported by the instant messaging system (different from private messaging), so I sent the seller my details there. While it was a little complicated, the time and money I saved using Agreetao was worth it.
To top it off, all major foreign credit cards are accepted so you don’t have to have a Chinese bank account or navigate confusing banking and validation systems.
Shopping should be a fun activity, and online shopping in particular shouldn’t be complicated. Agreetao offers the affordability of Taobao and the usability of Amazon, resulting in an ideal platform for shopaholics all over the world.
Thursday, January 14, 2016
Sunday, January 10, 2016
Something About China property bonds
To many global investors, bonds from China’s property sector are toxic nuclear waste, not to be touched at any cost. To others, they come with a more pragmatic “handle with care” warning. I belong to the latter camp.
From just a handful of bonds 10 years ago, the sector has grown to contribute 9.5% of the Asian US dollar bond market with US$51bn of bonds trading. That is nearly a third of all high-yield corporate bonds in the region.
Over this period, the sector has gone through three cycles of downturns and upturns. Several Chinese property companies have issued, redeemed and refinanced their offshore bonds. Companies with credit ratings ranging from Single A to Triple C have managed to issue bonds, which chinese trade credit actively in the secondary market. Yet, a feeling of unease persists.
Perhaps the first source of discomfort is the fact that offshore Chinese property bonds are deeply subordinated, since they are issued by offshore-incorporated entities, which inject the bond proceeds as equity into their onshore companies and service their debt only out of equity dividends received back from the mainland. The difficulties in repatriating equity funds out of China mean that the offshore principal effectively has to be refinanced. In case of bankruptcy, the onshore lenders have the first claim over the onshore assets.
While this structural weakness is undoubtedly true, it applies to every other bond issued by Chinese businesses, including investment-grade bonds far beyond the property sector, since the structure was born out of regulations prohibiting the issuance of debt or guarantees by mainland companies. (Only recently have the authorities begun to relax this prohibition, and the first few offshore bonds are now coming out with direct guarantees from mainland operating companies.)
ANOTHER SOURCE OF discomfort is the government’s meddling in the property sector through various measures, including the flow of credit to the builders, rules for financing land purchases, obtaining mortgages, and mortgage down-payment requirements. The harshest controls came in 2010 when the government restricted the number of apartments that an individual could purchase.
Property prices are a sensitive subject everywhere, and China is no exception. The government presses the brakes if the prices are speeding too fast and pushes the accelerator if property construction flags too much so as to threaten the overall economic growth.
This government intervention makes asset values volatile in both equity and debt markets, and raises the cost of capital to the sector.
Some investors have also been scared away by stories of oversupply and ghost cities. The property development business model, by definition, consists of a long operating cycle, and there may be genuine demand/supply imbalances, as in any other industry, but the overwhelming majority of Chinese properties are built in response to actual demand from a rapidly urbanising population. The same goes for talk of speculative buying, when the reality is that most of the properties are bought for self-occupation. Buyers have to put up a minimum 30% down-payment, they are not over-leveraged and there is no subprime lending.
WHEN IT COMES to investing in Chinese property bonds, one should realise that there has already been one level of filtering – only those companies large enough to go through a rating process and the expense of issuing offshore actually end up selling dollar bonds. They are all listed offshore, most of them in Hong Kong, and are subject to audits and disclosures that go with the listing status. The additional scrutiny from equity analysts and investors that comes with listing also offers additional information for bond investors.
There has not been a single default in the sector so far, and only two distressed exchanges in 2009, both at 80 cents to the dollar. Some companies did go through financial distress during previous sector downturns, but they managed to sell land or unfinished projects to stronger players and stave off default.
This is not to argue that we would never see a default in the sector. We will, sooner or later. But the sector has genuine fundamentals, strong and weak players, and saleable assets that can be realised in times of distress.
So, how should one approach investments in Chinese property bonds? First of all, investors need to be prepared for the volatility that comes with the regulatory changes. Any crash in value following a regulatory tightening offers an opportunity to pick up the higher-quality bonds at more attractive prices. In fact, such moves also enable the stronger players to buy out the weaker ones or to acquire assets from the struggling players, and increase their market share.
The current downturn in the market is no different. It is true that the stock of unsold property is running above average; that the leverage has increased in the last 12-18 months in response to slowing sales; that margins are under pressure due to the pressure to liquidate stock; and that some of the weaker companies are likely to experience a liquidity crunch in the next 12-18 months, unless they slow down their expansion. But the current downturn is also an opportunity to pick up bonds issued by stronger companies, which will benefit from the tight conditions in the sector. The challenge is reading the credit fundamentals carefully enough to identify the winners.
From just a handful of bonds 10 years ago, the sector has grown to contribute 9.5% of the Asian US dollar bond market with US$51bn of bonds trading. That is nearly a third of all high-yield corporate bonds in the region.
Over this period, the sector has gone through three cycles of downturns and upturns. Several Chinese property companies have issued, redeemed and refinanced their offshore bonds. Companies with credit ratings ranging from Single A to Triple C have managed to issue bonds, which chinese trade credit actively in the secondary market. Yet, a feeling of unease persists.
Perhaps the first source of discomfort is the fact that offshore Chinese property bonds are deeply subordinated, since they are issued by offshore-incorporated entities, which inject the bond proceeds as equity into their onshore companies and service their debt only out of equity dividends received back from the mainland. The difficulties in repatriating equity funds out of China mean that the offshore principal effectively has to be refinanced. In case of bankruptcy, the onshore lenders have the first claim over the onshore assets.
While this structural weakness is undoubtedly true, it applies to every other bond issued by Chinese businesses, including investment-grade bonds far beyond the property sector, since the structure was born out of regulations prohibiting the issuance of debt or guarantees by mainland companies. (Only recently have the authorities begun to relax this prohibition, and the first few offshore bonds are now coming out with direct guarantees from mainland operating companies.)
ANOTHER SOURCE OF discomfort is the government’s meddling in the property sector through various measures, including the flow of credit to the builders, rules for financing land purchases, obtaining mortgages, and mortgage down-payment requirements. The harshest controls came in 2010 when the government restricted the number of apartments that an individual could purchase.
Property prices are a sensitive subject everywhere, and China is no exception. The government presses the brakes if the prices are speeding too fast and pushes the accelerator if property construction flags too much so as to threaten the overall economic growth.
This government intervention makes asset values volatile in both equity and debt markets, and raises the cost of capital to the sector.
Some investors have also been scared away by stories of oversupply and ghost cities. The property development business model, by definition, consists of a long operating cycle, and there may be genuine demand/supply imbalances, as in any other industry, but the overwhelming majority of Chinese properties are built in response to actual demand from a rapidly urbanising population. The same goes for talk of speculative buying, when the reality is that most of the properties are bought for self-occupation. Buyers have to put up a minimum 30% down-payment, they are not over-leveraged and there is no subprime lending.
WHEN IT COMES to investing in Chinese property bonds, one should realise that there has already been one level of filtering – only those companies large enough to go through a rating process and the expense of issuing offshore actually end up selling dollar bonds. They are all listed offshore, most of them in Hong Kong, and are subject to audits and disclosures that go with the listing status. The additional scrutiny from equity analysts and investors that comes with listing also offers additional information for bond investors.
There has not been a single default in the sector so far, and only two distressed exchanges in 2009, both at 80 cents to the dollar. Some companies did go through financial distress during previous sector downturns, but they managed to sell land or unfinished projects to stronger players and stave off default.
This is not to argue that we would never see a default in the sector. We will, sooner or later. But the sector has genuine fundamentals, strong and weak players, and saleable assets that can be realised in times of distress.
So, how should one approach investments in Chinese property bonds? First of all, investors need to be prepared for the volatility that comes with the regulatory changes. Any crash in value following a regulatory tightening offers an opportunity to pick up the higher-quality bonds at more attractive prices. In fact, such moves also enable the stronger players to buy out the weaker ones or to acquire assets from the struggling players, and increase their market share.
The current downturn in the market is no different. It is true that the stock of unsold property is running above average; that the leverage has increased in the last 12-18 months in response to slowing sales; that margins are under pressure due to the pressure to liquidate stock; and that some of the weaker companies are likely to experience a liquidity crunch in the next 12-18 months, unless they slow down their expansion. But the current downturn is also an opportunity to pick up bonds issued by stronger companies, which will benefit from the tight conditions in the sector. The challenge is reading the credit fundamentals carefully enough to identify the winners.
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| chinese trade credit |
Thursday, January 7, 2016
Shanghai Local Restaurant Food
If the relationship between the past and present to describe Shanghai cuisine, it is past and local cuisine, and this life is Shanghai cuisine. Used to narrow the Shanghai cuisine is the cuisine, usually refers to the old people of Shanghai dishes,Local restaurant search and the generalized Shanghai dishes called new Shanghai dish is the cuisine is based, absorption of Guangdong, Sichuan, Ning Yang, Su, tin and other local flavor and Western food cooking methods, pay attention to take many long push Chen Chuxin, reflecting the accept fresh things Shanghai diet spirit.
Shanghai cuisine cooking braised, fried, steamed, stir and simmer for worse. Thick red oil sauce is Shanghai food is the most traditional features, meaning zhinongweihou, heavy oil, sugar, bright color, used to describe the Shanghai local cuisine braised dishes. Toothed burclover circle, oil and Butter Crab, oil burst shrimp these are old Shanghai restaurant will point the dish, the characteristics of "thick red oil sauce," show incisively and vividly. Shanghai food and day location, wide selection of materials, materials of fresh, seasonal stress. Four seasons climate gave Shanghai quarterly the freshest ingredients, for example in the spring to eat raw stir toothed burclover, stir Lycium chinense Mill, saury, back to the fish, the summer eat fried eel paste, refined steamed shad, crystal shrimp in autumn and winter, and stir fried crab with butter, shrimp big bird ginseng, herring bald lung dishes. Shanghai cuisine in the penetration of the Shanghai People's character, gentle and delicate, refreshing cool, Wen did not fire is Shanghai cuisine consistent style, embody the people of Shanghai fine and delicate.
In addition to the thick oil red sauce of this group of food and beverage, the most so that Shanghai people are proud of a variety of folk snacks. Both familiar "cake, fried dough sticks, soybean milk, rice and millet" four diamond, or a native of fried bread, Nanxiang, Sam sun small wonton, crab shell yellow, always remind the bottom of my heart the most warm food and memory. Taste the classic Shanghai flavor snacks, familiar with the spread of happiness.
Shanghai is also a special petty bourgeoisie of the city, in this full of romantic land, too many delicious to tie him down a our steps. Whether it is in a lazy afternoon, in the high-rise buildings in the Bund to taste afternoon tea, or find a old villas private restaurant, cup staggered back to the 1930s Shanghai, alleys of the old Shikumen, and flowing exotic bar, everything can become amorous Huai old objects, eat shopping will let you warp.
Shanghai braise in soy sauce meat mainly with rock sugar fried candy colors, accompanied with a small amount of soy sauce, and red color bright attractive, fat but not greasy, taste sweet side, importers melted, memorable, and show the characteristics of Shanghai cuisine thick red oil sauce.
More Reading:
Din Tai Fung Shanghai
Shanghai cuisine cooking braised, fried, steamed, stir and simmer for worse. Thick red oil sauce is Shanghai food is the most traditional features, meaning zhinongweihou, heavy oil, sugar, bright color, used to describe the Shanghai local cuisine braised dishes. Toothed burclover circle, oil and Butter Crab, oil burst shrimp these are old Shanghai restaurant will point the dish, the characteristics of "thick red oil sauce," show incisively and vividly. Shanghai food and day location, wide selection of materials, materials of fresh, seasonal stress. Four seasons climate gave Shanghai quarterly the freshest ingredients, for example in the spring to eat raw stir toothed burclover, stir Lycium chinense Mill, saury, back to the fish, the summer eat fried eel paste, refined steamed shad, crystal shrimp in autumn and winter, and stir fried crab with butter, shrimp big bird ginseng, herring bald lung dishes. Shanghai cuisine in the penetration of the Shanghai People's character, gentle and delicate, refreshing cool, Wen did not fire is Shanghai cuisine consistent style, embody the people of Shanghai fine and delicate.
In addition to the thick oil red sauce of this group of food and beverage, the most so that Shanghai people are proud of a variety of folk snacks. Both familiar "cake, fried dough sticks, soybean milk, rice and millet" four diamond, or a native of fried bread, Nanxiang, Sam sun small wonton, crab shell yellow, always remind the bottom of my heart the most warm food and memory. Taste the classic Shanghai flavor snacks, familiar with the spread of happiness.
Shanghai is also a special petty bourgeoisie of the city, in this full of romantic land, too many delicious to tie him down a our steps. Whether it is in a lazy afternoon, in the high-rise buildings in the Bund to taste afternoon tea, or find a old villas private restaurant, cup staggered back to the 1930s Shanghai, alleys of the old Shikumen, and flowing exotic bar, everything can become amorous Huai old objects, eat shopping will let you warp.
Shanghai braise in soy sauce meat mainly with rock sugar fried candy colors, accompanied with a small amount of soy sauce, and red color bright attractive, fat but not greasy, taste sweet side, importers melted, memorable, and show the characteristics of Shanghai cuisine thick red oil sauce.
More Reading:
Din Tai Fung Shanghai
Sunday, January 3, 2016
How about China’s economy tanks?
The Chinese housing bubble is at risk of bursting due to economic imbalances. If China’s housing bubble bursts, a shockwave will reverberate through its economy, causing a dramatic slowdown that will spread around the world. Utilizing a powerful new simulation tool, we forecast how a “hard landing” for China would impact the global economy.
China’s business climate is uncertain and growing more so by the day. Cheap china trade credit and a ballooning shadow banking sector in the past few years drove a massive increase in new lending, which fueled a red-hot real estate market and excess construction. As the economy cooled, the massive housing supply ramp-up resulted in high vacancy rates in some Chinese cities, which led to steep price discounts on new properties and rising default rates among smaller property developers.
Global corporations are watching China closely, wondering what will happen next. If the situation were to spiral out of control, they must be able to evaluate the impact on their business quickly and make appropriate course corrections. For instance, what does a hard landing in China mean for interest rates, trade, capital investment, commodity prices, and consumer demand, not only in China but in Europe, India, the US, and elsewhere? The more variables they can control to simulate possible scenarios, the better prepared they will be to respond to the one that actually unfolds.
Using a new econometric simulation tool called the Global Link Model, IHS is able to quantify the impact of economic shocks and regulatory changes to test a wide range of scenarios on the global economy. The model includes 68 countries and is linked to sector-specific econometric models, enabling users to see how changes in the macro-economy impact sectors and companies, as well as how changes at the micro level influence overall economic developments.
This article examines the consequences of just one scenario: a hard landing in China and the impact it would have on both the Chinese economy and the global economy. We define a hard landing as annual GDP growth for China of less than 5%. See the table at the end of this article that captures the impact on GDP growth for 15 of the largest economies in the world.
China’s business climate is uncertain and growing more so by the day. Cheap china trade credit and a ballooning shadow banking sector in the past few years drove a massive increase in new lending, which fueled a red-hot real estate market and excess construction. As the economy cooled, the massive housing supply ramp-up resulted in high vacancy rates in some Chinese cities, which led to steep price discounts on new properties and rising default rates among smaller property developers.
Global corporations are watching China closely, wondering what will happen next. If the situation were to spiral out of control, they must be able to evaluate the impact on their business quickly and make appropriate course corrections. For instance, what does a hard landing in China mean for interest rates, trade, capital investment, commodity prices, and consumer demand, not only in China but in Europe, India, the US, and elsewhere? The more variables they can control to simulate possible scenarios, the better prepared they will be to respond to the one that actually unfolds.
Using a new econometric simulation tool called the Global Link Model, IHS is able to quantify the impact of economic shocks and regulatory changes to test a wide range of scenarios on the global economy. The model includes 68 countries and is linked to sector-specific econometric models, enabling users to see how changes in the macro-economy impact sectors and companies, as well as how changes at the micro level influence overall economic developments.
This article examines the consequences of just one scenario: a hard landing in China and the impact it would have on both the Chinese economy and the global economy. We define a hard landing as annual GDP growth for China of less than 5%. See the table at the end of this article that captures the impact on GDP growth for 15 of the largest economies in the world.
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